The RCC-is designed to initialize only once. We envision that initialization would occur in the presence of representatives,frOm both Parties to a future treaty and would occur close to where the weapon was removed from its deployed position. After initialization, the RCC would remain securely-attached to I the weapon storage container and remain there 'until the weapon is verifiably destroyed. While attached to the storage container, the device could be polled at any time via a secure radio-frequency link. The rate of polling would be dictated by security requirements, but we anticipate it would be at least once per day.
A major design difficulty for Our monitoring System is coping with changes in background radiation. We anticipate that the device will be initialized in a relatively low radiation backgroucd environment. After initialization, the weapon (and attached RCC) Will be transported to a weapon storage facility to await dismantlement. The radiation background from other weapons in *e storage facility is expected to be much higher than the background present at the initialization site. Indeed, for many possible storage configurations the background may be comparable in strength to the signal from the weapon to which the RCC is attached. Thus, a critical design requirement of the RCC is to greatly suppress radiation background while maintaining sensitivity to the weapon being monitored. If I We describe the design and construction of an instrument designed to monitor compliance with future arms control &ea-ted by a stored nuclear weapon, our device is able to Sense krturbations in the contents of a weapon storage container that would indicate treaty non-compliance. Our instrument (dubbed the Radiation Continuity Checker or RCC) is designed to detect significant perturbations in the gamma-ray spectra (indicative of tampering) while storing no classified information about *the w?apon, and having a negligible "false alarm rate".
In this paper we describe the technical details of two prototype instruments and describe the strategies we have adopted to perform signal processing in these instruments. Our first instrument prototype uses a scintillation spectrometer and a massive tungsten alloy collimator to reject the gmma-ray background. Our second prototype instrument makes use of an active collimation scheme employing a multiple detector Compton scatter approach to reject background radiation. The signal processing method we employ uses linear algorithms applied pulse by pulse. This eliminates the need for storage of pulse height spectra, which are in many cases classified.
ties. By monitoring changes in the gamma-ray spectrum emit-
The successful implementation of future arms control treaties may be limited by the technical means used to verify variOUs aspects Of the weapon process. A background suppression is not sufficient, "false a l m s " could Particularly vexing problem in treaty be induced with unacceptable frequency by changes in the is the problem of monitoring nuclear weapons that have been "ved froma deployed position but are awaiting full disassembly. For instance, it has been estimated that it would take the U S . five years to dismantle 1060 weapons. How could Party be assured that the us ' weapons were not tampered with Or diverted during the lengthy period when the weapons 'are awaiting dismantlement and still in US possession? The instrument we are developing is intended to improve transparency during these periods. In particular, we are designing a device to monitor a nuclear weapon awaiting dismantlement and ensure-through a secure comfnunication link and without revealing classified information-that the weapon remains unaltered. Tlie appioacti we have dosen to solve this problem IS to use one or more small gamma-ray detectors mounted on a background even if the weapon remained intact. Such false alarms would severely reduce the instrument's utility for arms. control and treaty verification, Two approaches to background suppression were employed in our instruments: a passive approach employing a tungsten alloy collimator, and an active approach employing an "electronic collimator". The details of the two prototypes employing these different collimation approaches are discussed below.
PASSIVE COLLIMATOR PROTOTYPE
A. ~~~i~~ ove,-,,iew prototype RCC instrument was designed to use gamma-ray pulse height information to detect changes in the emissions from a weapon storage container. We used a scintillation spectrometer inside a tungsten alloy background shield ' . t
L a
olution was not a requirement in this instrument, bui small size was; thus we chose the.small PMT because it onstruction of one of the smallest detector assemblies le using only :o-mme,fciaIly available components.
The scintillatorAPMT assembly wp. mounted I inside a tungsten alloy collimator with the PMT pointing toward the collimator opening. A photographbof one' of the tungsten collimators is shown in Figure 3 . The thickness of the 'collimator was determined by estimating. the ,anticipated radiation environment and computing the transport of this estimated radiation through the collimator.. The criteria used to establish collimator thickness was the attenuation ,required to suppress this background intensity such th? it was no greater than 1% of the intensity of the gamma-ray emissions from the weapon being monitored. The shape of the collimator was arrived at by copustraining the field of view <detector to include ?e central axis of the storage contai ut to exclude radiati0.n originating from outside the container. The total collimator mass was 12 kg:
. ,
I
Figure 3: Photograph of a tungsten alloy collimator used in the RCC passive collimator prototype. The high voltage and signal leads to the scintillatorPMT detector can be seen on the right of the picture exiting from the bottom of the collimator t .
C. Electronic Readout
The electronics used to readout the detector in the passive RCC prototype consisted of the usual analog pulse processing componenrs used in pulse height spectroscopy. The analog "front end' c'onsisted of a charge sensitive preamplifier, a shaping amplifier and a p&k sample and hold. The analog process-' ing components were implemented on a single ASIC fabricated using Honeywell's ALB 1 A bipolar process. Additional details of the analog ASIC we used in our first -prototype are given in [I] . and.high voltage power supply, and at the bottom center .is.the 1" : ' the radio frequency ,~~smissipn~u"it.':After assemblingiand 8 debugging the. electronics ' unit it-was detemiined that &e. e initial spectrum, has occurred (indicating an alarm condition). SI is therefore a me&& of the similahty qf the subsequent spectrum to the initial one.
. ; , f $ , I t 1 storage container7 the correlation algoritlp that we used with the pass showed similar performaqce to the correlation algo,rithm,with-' cessing and coincidence dlectron I j
B. Detector Design
*The second algorithm +we used;in the passive 'collimator prototype is &in to the basic dot product of linear algebra.
Three detectors were used in the active collimator protoAssume that the-pulse height spectrum acquired from the scin-type, arranged in a triangular geomevY, as d-" in Figure 5 . tillation detector is represented by the vector H, where the ele-The arrangement can be thought of as two independent Pairs of ments of H represent counts and thesindices of Hjepresent the coincidence detectors. In the nOrma1 deployment mode the two pulse amplitude. Further assume that there exists a vector W, rear detectors are set at an angle of40 degrees relative t0-a VeGwhich may be thought of a s a weighting v,ector. If we,t&e the tor PeTendicular to the surface of the P'eaPon storage condot p~o&& of w we obtain a sc$ar ValueLQ', which tainer through the centerJof the "front" detector. The detector, may. be ,thought of as measure of -the, similarity of the pulse electronics system. was designed to measure'Photons in the' height spectrum H to the generic weighting vector W. Note 400 keV +I-50 keV rkgion 'from the decai of 239Pu.' At that the weighting vector, w@$h.,must be stored in\ memory, 400 keV a photon scattering 40 degrees from the front detector does not have to,contain any classified information. In,our tri-. to one of the rear detectors would deposit 62 keV in the front als we obtained good performance using a simple weighting detector and 338 keV in one of the rear detectors; this partivector which consisted of a set of coefficients that increased is-tioning of'the total photon energy ensures that' all 'signals are ' a linear fashion. out the need for direct storage of spectral information. . ~ r * . , well above the lower level discriminator thresholds. 
Storage Container
Figure 5: Diagram of the geometry used for the RCC active collimator prototype. The gamma-rays from the weapon in the storage container that Compton scatter from the front detector into either of the rear detectors are those of interest. The scatter angle used was chosen as a tradeoff among high sensitivity to changes in the weapon, low sensitivity to background outside the storage container, and large deposited energy in the front detector.
There are two drawbacks of the 40 degree detector angle. Thd first is that the backprojected Compton cone sweeps out a substantial volume outside oftthe storage container being monitored, as shown diagrammatically in Figure 6 . The second is that the data rate drops by a factor of about two relative to the rate for shallow-angle Compton scattering (i.e. scatter angle near zero degrees). Conversely, if a smaller angle is used between the front and-rear detectors -such that .the backprojected Compton cone lies completely inside the containerto? little energy is deposited inithe front detector to reliably distinguish the, scattering event. The 40 degree angle between the front and rear detectors is-a compromise between favorable energy partitioning amongst the detectors on the one hand, and background rejection and overall data rate on the other. Although the background will 'not be effectively rejected with a single detector pair, we believe that signal processing algorithms can be developed thatluse both pairs of detectors to increase background rejection.
I

C. Electronic Readout
I
The electronic readout system we used in our active collimator prototype consisted of three channels of pulse height spectroscopy, coincident logic, and a computer acting as a multi-parameter analyzer. The analog front-end (preamplifier, shaper, peak sample and hold, and coincidence logic) were implemented in discrete components (no ASIC's), thus anticipating and avoiding future security issues. Pulse height acquisition was performed with a National Instiuments PXI-6025E data acquisition board inside a PXI crate.,The data acquisition board used a single 12-bit ADC and an analog multiplexor to sequentially read the three channels. Data acquisitions and signal processing were controlled by a Pentium-based PXI bus controller card, running Microsoft Windows 98 and National Instruments LabVIEW 5.0. An example of data acquired with the active collimator prototype is shown in Figure 7 . ,.
Nuclear Weapon i itorage Container
Figure 6: Diagram of the view obtained from the backprojection cone for a scatter event between the firit pair of detectors. A large fraction of the view is outside the storage container, and is thus sensitive to the external background. This undesirable situation arises because of the need to have a minimum scatter angle to deposit:sufficient energy in' the front.detector. The problem is resolved throught the use of both pairs of scatter detectors.
D. Signal Processing
As of this writing, -software to perform the signal processing in the electronic collimator prototype .is still under development. However, we anticipate using a dot product algorithm, similar to that used in the passive collimator prototype.. 
IV. SIGNAL PROCESSING ISSUES .
Both of our prototype RCC units constrbcted 'so far employed local computers to perform the signal processing. 'In the future, we would like to develop 'units that do .not' use microprocessors. A microprocessor-free unit is highly desirable from a security point of view because its operation can be more easily reverse engineered to ensure that it is performing as intended. In addition, it is very desirable if the unit does not store any acquired pulse height information. Stored pulse height information may reveal classified information about the weapon being monitored, and any unit containing classified information would be subject to awkward handling procedures to ensur? the integrity and security of the stored classified data. Example multi-parameter data obtained with the PXI-cratebased RCC active collimator prototype. The horizontal axis is the pulse height in the front detector, while the vertical axis is the pulse height in one of the rear detectors. This dataset was obtained for a 133Ba source placed on the system centerline with no container present. The features resulting from the two possible scatter trajectories from one pair of detectors are indicated on the plot.
The absence of a microprocessor and pulse height memory, seem, initially, to be severe limitations on the construction of. an RCC unit. However, after studying the various types of signal processing options,available, we believe there may still be a large class of suitable algorithms. In particular, any linear algorithm may be deploye'd without storing the pulse height spectrum in memory. Since linearity is -by definition -the condition that the algorithm will produce the same result irrespective of whether it operates on a complete-pulse height l ktogram or on one pulse at,a time. Thus, any linear algorithm tional backprojection algorithms often employ a nonlinear step (thresholding) to distinguish localized information above background ([2] and [31) , and we are not yet certain if a purely linear algorithm can be employed effectively. *Additionally, of course, even if an algorithm is theoretically possible to use, implementing it without a microprocessor, using simple hardware may be a challenge.
V. CONCLUSIONS
We have built and tested two instruments to monitor stored nuclear weapons awaiting dismantlement. The use of gammaray spectroscopy to look f y changes in the contents of a weapon storage container is, in principle, a straightforward problem to solve. However, the constraints imposed by large changes in background radiation and security restrictions make the design of an effective instrument very challenging. Our research to date indicates that Compton-based electronic collimation is a very promising approach. However, it remains to be seen whether this method can be rendered effectively without using a microprocessor or a stored pulse height spectrum.
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